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In recognition memory, one of the most striking find-
ings is people’s tendency to mistakenly recognize words
that have not been observed but are semantically related to
observed words. Experiments in the DRM paradigm (e.g.,
McDermott & Roediger, 1998) have shown this effect dra-
matically. After people have been presented with several
interrelated words, such as door, glass, pane, and ledge,
they are very likely to falsely recognize a highly associ-
ated, critical lure item, such as window. Often, the false
alarm rate for critical lure items is about as high as the hit
rate for presented words. The aim of our experiments was
to address the role strategic processing plays during recog-
nition judgments in helping to avoid false recognition. By
strategic processing, we refer to those memory processes
that are relatively slow and under intentional control, cor-
responding roughly to the controlled processing in Schnei-
der and Shiffrin’s (1977) distinction between controlled
and automatic processing. 
This distinction is consistent with other theoretical ac-
counts of memory. For example, Dodson and Schacter
(2001) proposed that the distinctiveness heuristic is a gen-
eral purpose, strategic process for avoiding false memory
errors. The distinctiveness heuristic fits within the broader
category of monitoring processes for distinguishing experi-
enced events from nonexperienced events in the activation-
monitoring framework (see Roediger, Balota, & Watson,
2001, and Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001,
for a review of evidence for the activation-monitoring
framework). More generally, two-process accounts of recog-
nition memory typically draw a distinction between quicker,
more automatic familiarity-based processing and slower,
more controlled recall-like processing (e.g., Jacoby, 1991;
see Rotello & Heit, 1999, and Yonelinas, 2002, for re-
views). In addition, single-process accounts of recognition
(e.g., Lamberts, Brockdorff, & Heit, 2002) can assume
that some featural information is processed very quickly,
whereas other details of stimuli are processed later during
the course of making a judgment. In Lamberts et al.’s model,
the relative influence of features, once they have been
processed, is determined by strategic factors. The statisti-
cal effect of strategy would be zero at the earliest possible
response time, before any stimulus features have been
processed, and the effect of strategy would increase at later
times, as more features are processed.
We investigated strategic processing in two ways. First,
in our experiments, we examined the time course of the
false memory effect. Most previous experiments have sim-
ply involved self-paced recognition judgments and, there-
fore, have not distinguished between what happens auto-
matically during a judgment and what occurs after longer
deliberation. One exception is a study by Benjamin (2001,
Experiment 2), which showed that speeded judgments led
to a stronger false memory effect than did unspeeded judg-
ments. Relatedly, Tun, Wingfield, Rosen, and Blanchard
(1998) found an association between fast responses and
increased levels of false recognition in a self-paced recog-
nition task. In our own experiments, we used the response
signal technique (Reed, 1973; see Heit, Brockdorff, &
Lamberts, 2003, and Rotello & Heit, 1999, for reviews), in
which the time allowed to generate a recognition judgment
is under strict experimental control. Although we would
not propose a sharp cutoff, in previous research it has been
assumed that the processing taking place before 500-msec
response signals would be relatively automatic, whereas later
processing would increasingly reflect strategic influences.
The second way we investigated strategic processing
was to give different instructions to different groups of
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In two experiments, the response signal technique (Reed, 1973) was combined with the DRM para-
digm (e.g., McDermott & Roediger, 1998) to investigate the time course of false recognition memory—
in particular, how this effect varies along the time course of generating a recognition judgment. Across
the experiments, in addition to standard instructions, there were forewarning instructions encourag-
ing the participants to avoid this effect, as well as inclusion instructions intended to enhance this ten-
dency. It was found that the false memory effect was at its strongest at earlier response signals, di-
minishing when more time was given to make a recognition judgment. The forewarning instructions
led to a more conservative overall response bias, rather than to a reduction of the effect. However, the
participants were able to exaggerate this effect in the inclusion condition. The results are discussed in
terms of the role of strategic processing in recognition memory. 
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participants (as in, e.g., McDermott & Roediger, 1998).
In both experiments, there were standard, or neutral, in-
structions, as well as instructions that forewarned the par-
ticipants about the false memory effect and instructed
them to try to avoid it. If strategic processing allows par-
ticipants to avoid the false memory effect, it should be
possible to affect the degree of the false memory effect by
giving suitable instructions. 
Predictions
Our working hypothesis was that false memory errors
would arise mainly as a consequence of automatic pro-
cessing and that the role of strategic processing would be
mainly to help correct these errors. This hypothesis arises
naturally from previous theoretical accounts in this area,
but we emphasize that these points have not previously
been articulated or tested. From the working hypothesis
followed a number of predictions. First, with standard in-
structions, the false memory effect should be evident rel-
atively early during the time course of making a recogni-
tion judgment. Second, in the standard condition, at later
points during the course of making a judgment, strategic
processing should lead to a reduction of the effect. Third,
because reduction of the effect is under strategic control,
giving participants forewarning instructions should lead
to a reduction of the effect, particularly at later points dur-
ing the course of making a judgment. 
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants. The paid participants were 40 students from the
University of Warwick, 20 in the standard condition and 20 in the
forewarning condition. 
Apparatus and Stimuli. The experiment was controlled by a com-
puter with a 17-in. (43-cm) monitor. The word lists were based on
the 32 categories in the Stadler, Roediger, and McDermott (1999)
norms that led to the strongest levels of false recognition. We chose
nine members from each category to be used as the studied items,
and there was one critical lure item per category. In some cases, the
lists were adapted slightly for British usage.
Four experimental study and test lists were used per participant.
Each study list contained 72 experimental stimuli and 6 filler stim-
uli (3 at the start and 3 at the end) to control for primacy and recency
effects. The 72 experimental stimuli were nine members from each
of eight categories and were presented in random order. 
Each test list consisted of 40 words. Sixteen old words (2 ran-
domly selected from each of 8 categories), 16 new (unrelated)
words, and the eight nonpresented critical lures from the 8 cate-
gories. New words were words selected to be unrelated to any of the
32 categories used for the study and test lists. For each participant,
the old, new, and critical lure sets of words were each split randomly
into four groups of equal size, assigning them to the four response
signals. 
Procedure. The experimental session consisted of a practice
block followed by the four experimental blocks. Each block con-
sisted of a study phase followed immediately by a test phase. The
practice block (not reported here) merely gave the participant some
experience with the response signal procedure. 
In the study phase, the words in the study list were presented at a
rate of 3 sec per word. The participants were instructed to try to re-
member each word. For the test phase, the participants were in-
structed to press the old button if the test word was one previously
seen during study and to press the new button if the word had not
been seen. The response button mappings were counterbalanced
across subjects. On each test trial, a cue was shown at the center of
the screen for 500 msec. The screen went blank for 100 msec, and
then a word appeared, in lowercase. At variable time lags after the
stimulus appeared on the screen (200, 400, 600, or 1,100 msec), a
tone sounded. The participants were instructed to respond immedi-
ately when they heard the tone and to respond as accurately as pos-
sible. If no response was made within 300 msec of the onset of the
tone or if a response was made before onset, an error message was
displayed. Summary feedback about accuracy and proportion of re-
sponse in time was given after each test phase.
The participants in the forewarning condition were given two
paragraphs of additional instructions (derived from McDermott &
Roediger, 1998) just before the first experimental block, as a “hint
to improve accuracy scores.” They were told that groups of words in
each list were associated with one common word that would not be
presented. The participants were instructed to try not to mistakenly
classify the nonpresented common word as old when it was pre-
sented during test. They were given an example that the word king
could be linked to other words, such as queen, crown, and palace ,
and they would need to avoid saying that king was an old word if it
had not actually been studied. 
Results
The data were trimmed to remove late responses, made
more than 350 msec after the response signal (6%), and
anticipatory responses, made earlier than 100 msec after
the response signal (5%). In terms of the proportion of ex-
cluded responses across response signals, there did not seem
to be a systematic pattern distinguishing the conditions in
either experiment.
First, we present the proportion of old responses to old,
new, and critical lure test stimuli for the four different re-
sponse signals, with mean response time added, in Figure 1.
(Error bars indicate standard errors of the means.) In the
standard condition, the participants were able to distin-
guish between old and new unrelated items even at the ear-
liest time signal. Furthermore, discrimination between old
and new items generally improved at later response sig-
nals. The proportion of old responses to critical lure items
was always between the levels of responding to old items
and new items. However, after the first response signal, old
responses to old items tended to increase, whereas there
was a fall in old responses to critical lures. In the forewarn-
ing condition, it appears that the forewarning instructions
did indeed affect responses. The proportion of old re-
sponses was generally lower in the forewarning condition
for all three kinds of stimuli. These results were analyzed
with a three-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). There
was a significant main effect of instructions [F(1,38) =
7.87, MSe = 0.14, p , .01], reflecting the lower overall
proportion of old responses for the forewarning condition.
The effect of instructions did not interact with item type
[F(2,76) = 0.24, MSe = 0.05], implying that the instructions
affected old, new, and critical lure items. There was a sig-
nificant interaction between instructions and response sig-
nal [F(3,114) = 4.98, MSe = 0.09, p , .01], suggesting a
greater effect of forewarning at earlier response signals. For
completeness, we note that there was a significant main ef-
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fect of item type [F(2,76) = 215.54, MSe = 0.05, p, .001],
and a significant interaction between item and response
signal [F(6,228) = 16.97, MSe = 0.02, p , .001]. There
was no significant main effect of response signal or three-
way interaction.
Raw score measures have some disadvantages, such as
not being specifically aimed at a theoretical goal and not
correcting for potential changes in response bias at differ-
ent response signals (Heit et al., 2003; Rotello & Heit,
1999). Therefore, we next will present the key measure that
is specifically targeted at the false memory effect and sub-
tracts out effects of response bias. Because the effect is usu-
ally described in terms of responses to critical lures being
nearly the same as responses to old items, we calculated
difference scores between proportions of old responses to
old items versus critical lures, in d ¢ units.1 (See also Gallo,
Roediger, & McDermott, 2001, and Koutstaal, Schacter, &
Brenner, 2001.) In Figure 2, a zero value along the y-axis
indicates zero ability to distinguish lures from old items—
that is, the strongest possible effect. Higher values in this
figure indicate better ability to reject lures, relative to old
items—that is, a weaker effect. There is practically no dif-
ference in responding to old items versus critical lures at
the earliest response signal, suggesting that the effect was
at its strongest level. In general, the participants’ ability to
distinguish between old items and critical lures was better
at later response signals. There did not appear to be a sys-
tematic influence of instructions on this measure of the
false memory effect. A two-way ANOVA showed a signif-
icant main effect of response signal [F(3,114)= 5.85, MSe =
0.34, p, .001]. The measures were compared at different
pairs of response signals (pooling across the two instruc-
tional conditions), using paired t tests (all t tests employed
a Bonferroni correction to yield a family-wise error rate of
0.05). With this analysis, two pairs of response signals were
significantly different: the first versus the third and the first
versus the fourth. The ANOVA did not show a main effect
of instructions [F(1,38) = 0.00, MSe = 0.58], and likewise,
there was no significant interaction between response sig-
nal and instructions [F(3,114) = 1.28, MSe = 0.34].
Finally, to complement the d ¢ analysis, we calculated
response bias on the old and critical lure items, using the
c measure (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991).2 These mea-
sures are presented in Figure 3. The main finding was
greater conservatism in the forewarning condition. The ef-
fect of instructions was statistically significant [F(1,38) =
Figure 1. Proportion of old responses at varying response signals, with response times (RTs) added, in
Experiment 1.
Figure 2. Discrimination between old items and critical lures
(d ¢ ) at varying response signals, with response times (RTs) added,
in Experiment 1.
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8.30, MSe = 0.65, p, .01]. There was also a main effect of
response signal [F(3,114) = 4.02, MSe = 0.13, p, .01], and
there was no significant interaction.
Discussion
The results, in terms of the key measure of the false
memory effect, gave good support for the first two pre-
dictions regarding the standard condition—namely, the
false memory effect appeared early during the time course
of making a recognition judgment, and it was reduced at
later points in time. These results are consistent with the
idea that the false memory effect arises from automatic
processing and is reduced by strategic processing.
In contrast, the third prediction did not receive obvious
support: The forewarning instructions did not reduce the
effect in terms of ability to distinguish old items from crit-
ical lures. Forewarning merely led the participants to have
a more conservative response bias. Several previous stud-
ies, in which the response signal procedure was not used,
have also shown that the false memory effect remains
strong after forewarning, with the warning having, at
most, a moderate influence (e.g., McDermott & Roediger,
1998; see Neuschatz, Benoit, & Payne, 2003, for a re-
view). We note that these other studies were also different
in some other details, such as length of study list and use
of blocked presentation of words from a single category,
rather than intermixed categories, so Experiment 1 surely
does not rule out the possibility that forewarning can be
somewhat, if not completely, effective. 
Indeed, one way to reinterpret our working hypothesis,
which fits with Experiment 1 as well as with previous
studies, is that strategic processing is not completely ef-
fective at reducing false recognition. We note that existing
theoretical accounts of the false memory effect—namely,
the distinctiveness heuristic and the activation-monitoring
framework—would assume that strategic processing takes
place even in the standard condition. The lack of differ-
ence between the standard condition and the forewarning
condition could thus have been due to the imperfect nature
of strategic processing, so that the forewarning condition
could not improve upon the standard condition. 
In Experiment 2, we also compared standard and fore-
warning conditions, using shorter lists in case strategic
processes would be more effective. In addition, there was
an inclusion condition in which the participants were in-
structed to say “old” to the critical lures, rather than “new”
(see Brainerd, Wright, Reyna, & Mojardin, 2001, for a
similar technique). The fourth prediction for this condi-
tion was that the participants would be less likely to en-
gage in strategic processing that would otherwise reduce
false recognition. Hence, the reduction of the effect at
later response signals should appear in the standard and
forewarning conditions but should be less apparent in the
inclusion condition. In general, the inclusion condition was
a further examination of whether instructions can affect the
results in terms of d ¢ and, if so, at what point in time.
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
The method was like that in Experiment 1, except for the follow-
ing. There were 60 participants, 20 in each of three conditions. In ad-
dition to the standard and forewarning conditions, there was an in-
clusion condition in which the participants were instructed to say “old”
to the critical lures, rather than “new.” The instructions for the in-
clusion condition were in other ways modeled on the instructions for
the forewarning condition; indeed, the difference in instructions was
less than 10 words from a whole page of printed information.
In addition to the practice block, a total of eight experimental
study and test lists were used per participant. Each study list con-
tained 36 experimental stimuli and 6 filler stimuli. The 36 experi-
mental stimuli in each study list were nine members from each of
four categories. Each test list consisted of 20 words: 8 old words (2
randomly selected from each of four categories presented during
study), 8 new words, and the 4 nonpresented critical lures from the
four categories.
Results
The data were trimmed to remove late responses (7%)
and anticipatory responses (12%). We attribute the some-
what higher overall proportion of excluded results, relative
to Experiment 1, to the shorter test lists, which seemed to
disrupt performance slightly. 
First, we present the results in terms of raw scores in Fig-
ure 4. The graphs for the standard and forewarning condi-
tions are quite like the corresponding graphs for Experi-
ment 1. The inclusion condition had very different results,
with the critical lure items obtaining more old responses
than the old items. Although saying “old” to critical lures
would be a correct response, rather than an error, in the in-
clusion condition, we used the same measures of response
to critical lures in all three conditions. 
To maintain comparability with Experiment 1, we will
present an ANOVA with just the standard and forewarn-
Figure 3. Overall response bias (c, or tendency to say “new”)
at varying response signals, with response times (RTs) added, in
Experiment 1. 
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ing conditions. There was a significant main effect of in-
structions [F(1,38) = 7.81, MSe = 0.16, p , .01], reflect-
ing the lower overall proportion of old responses for the
forewarning condition. The effect of instructions did in-
teract with item type [F(2,76) = 4.31, MSe = 0.06, p ,
.05]. Inspection of Figure 4 suggests that this interaction
was due to a floor effect on new items, which did not have
much of a drop from the standard condition to the fore-
warning condition. There was a significant main effect of
item type [F(2,76) = 194.36, MSe = 0.06, p, .001] but no
significant main effect of response signal [F(3,114) =
2.13, MSe = 0.06]. There was no significant interaction be-
tween instructions and response signal [F(3,114) = 0.16,
MSe = 0.04]. The interaction between item and response
signal was significant [F(6,228) = 24.49, MSe = 0.02, p,
.001], but the overall three-way interaction was not sig-
nificant [F(6,228) = 0.82, MSe = 0.02]. Finally, we note
that in the standard condition, responses to the critical lure
items showed a sawtooth pattern across response signals;
however, none of the pairwise differences was statistically
significant, using paired t tests. (Also, we note that these
raw score measures did not correct for potential changes
in response bias at different response signals.)
We also conducted an ANOVA on just the inclusion
condition. There was a significant main effect of item type
[F(2,38) = 253.80, MSe = 0.04, p, .001]. All three of the
pairwise differences between critical lure, old, and new
items reached the level of statistical significance, using
paired t tests. There was no significant main effect of re-
sponse signal, and the interaction between item and re-
sponse signal was significant [F(6,114) = 29.60, MSe =
0.01, p , .001].
Next, we will present the key analysis, based on the dif-
ference between old items and critical lure items, in d ¢
units. These results are shown in Figure 5. As in Experi-
ment 1, there is nearly no difference in responding to old
Figure 4. Proportion of old responses at varying response signals, with response times (RTs) added, in
Experiment 2.
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items versus critical lures at the earliest response signal,
suggesting that the effect was at its strongest level at that
point. For the standard and forewarning instructions, the
effect was reduced at later response signals—that is, there
was a greater ability to distinguish critical lures from old
items. In contrast, for the inclusion condition the partici-
pants continued to treat critical lures like old items at later
response signals, and indeed, the slightly negative value of
the difference score reflects the higher proportion of old
responses to the critical lures. These results were analyzed
with a two-way ANOVA. There was a significant main ef-
fect of instructions [F(2,57) = 12.11, MSe = 0.71, p, .001].
The measures were compared at different pairs of instruc-
tional conditions (pooling across response signals), using
t tests. The standard and the forewarning conditions did
not differ significantly; however, the inclusion condition
differed significantly from those two conditions. There was
a significant main effect of response signal [F(3,171) =
9.80, MSe = 0.35, p, .001], and likewise, there was a sig-
nificant interaction between condition and response signal
[F(6,171) = 5.03, MSe = 0.35, p , .001], which fit with
what can be observed from Figure 5, that the difference
between the inclusion condition and the other two condi-
tions increased over time.3
Finally, to complement the d ¢ analysis, we calculated
response bias on the old and critical lure items, using the
c measure. These measures are presented in Figure 6. The
main finding is that bias to say “new” was greatest in the
forewarning condition, with more tendency to say “old” in
the standard condition and even more tendency to say
“old” in the inclusion condition. The effect of instructions
was statistically significant [F(2,57) = 52.19, MSe = 0.46,
p , .001]. Again using t tests, we found significant pair-
wise differences in response bias between all three in-
structional conditions. There was a main effect of response
signal [F(3,171) = 18.25, MSe = 0.14, p, .001], and there
was no significant interaction.
Discussion
The standard condition had results similar to those in
Experiment 1, supporting the first two predictions, that
the false memory effect would be strong early in the time
course of making a judgment and would be reduced later.
As in Experiment 1, forewarning instructions did not lead
to a change in the level of the false memory effect, as com-
pared with the standard condition; there was merely a
change in response bias.4 The results of the inclusion con-
dition fit the fourth prediction—namely, that the partici-
pants could avoid the strategic processing that would oth-
erwise reduce the false memory effect. Hence, the inclusion
condition showed a much stronger effect, as compared with
the standard and forewarning conditions. This difference
was greatest at later response times, consistent with a role
of strategic processing in reducing the false memory ef-
fect in the standard and forewarning conditions. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In empirical terms, these experiments suggest that the
false memory effect is strong at early points during the
time course of making a recognition judgment and weaker
at later points. Unlike previous studies (Benjamin, 2001;
Tun et al., 1998), this finding is not based on any data from
unspeeded or self-paced judgments. Likewise, there is fur-
ther evidence, fitting with previous results (e.g., McDer-
mott & Roediger, 1998; Neuschatz et al., 2003), that the
false memory effect is difficult to eliminate, even after in-
structions to avoid it.
Figure 6. Overall response bias (c, or tendency to say “new”) at
varying response signals, with response times (RTs) added, in Ex-
periment 2. 
Figure 5. Discrimination between old items and critical lures
(d ¢ ) at varying response signals, with response times (RTs) added,
in Experiment 2.
386 HEIT, BROCKDORFF, AND LAMBERTS
In theoretical terms, our results lead to the following
conclusions. On the assumption that earlier processing
during recognition judgments is relatively automatic and
later processing is more strategic, it appears that the false
memory effect arises due mainly to automatic processing.
People can reduce false recognition somewhat by applying
strategic processing, most evidently at the later response
signals. However, the strategic processing that can reduce
false recognition is not completely effective and, indeed,
was no more effective when explicit forewarning instruc-
tions were given. Finally, when given instructions not to
avoid the false memory effect, people can do this strategi-
cally as well, most notably at later response signals.
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NOTES
1. To avoid undefined values in the computation of d ¢, the hit rates and
false alarm rates were adjusted by adding 0.5 to the number of old re-
sponses and dividing by the number of responses +1.0 (Snodgrass &
Corwin, 1988). 
2. Higher values of c indicate more conservatism—that is, a greater
tendency to say “new” (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991, p. 33). 
3. In a supplemental analysis, we conducted an ANOVA on the stan-
dard and forewarning conditions for Experiments 1 and 2, pooled to-
gether. There was no significant main effect of instructions on d ¢, and
likewise, there was no significant interaction between response signal
and instructions. Moreover, a series of paired t tests taken at each re-
sponse signal did not reveal any significant differences between the stan-
dard and the forewarning conditions.
4. We also examined the effect of forewarning instructions specifi-
cally on stimuli for which Neuschatz et al. (2003) found some effect of
forewarning—namely, those categories for which 70% or more of their
participants could identify the central word that linked all the other
words together. Even for these high-identifiability lists, there was clearly
no effect of forewarning on d ¢. For example, in Experiment 1, the aver-
age d ¢ was 0.33 in the standard condition and 0.28 in the forewarning
condition. In Experiment 2, the average d ¢ was 0.37 in the standard con-
dition and 0.36 in the forewarning condition. (Note again that lower val-
ues of d ¢ correspond to a stronger false memory effect.) 
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